COMMENT
Pressure to Pray? Thinking beyond the
Coercion Test for Legislator-Led Prayer
Samuel Taxy†
The First Amendment to the Constitution commands that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” This provision is now generally interpreted to forbid a slew of policies and practices at the federal, state, and
local levels that endorse or enshrine religion. One flash point in the Establishment
Clause doctrine is prayer and government. Whereas one line of cases suggests that
prayer offered at government-sponsored events is unconstitutional if it is coercive,
another instructs that prayer offered in the legislative context is generally acceptable, at least if delivered by a third party.
This Comment addresses a burgeoning circuit split regarding the intersection
of these cases. Lower courts have struggled to come to an adequate answer to the
question of whether prayer offered in an intimate, constituent-facing legislative
context by councilmembers themselves is constitutional. This Comment analyzes
the various prayer cases as two overlapping constitutional prophylactic rules designed to prevent intrusive and time-intensive fact-finding into hard-to-ascertain
facts. There is also a parallel line of cases that militates against the constitutionality of legislative prayer—the government is supposed to refrain from practices that
have the potential to be politically divisive. Because prayers delivered by legislators
themselves are more potentially divisive than those offered by third parties, and
because the Court prefers strong prophylactic rules designed to prevent judicial
speculation into factors like the divisiveness of specific prayer content, legislatorled prayer should be per se forbidden.
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INTRODUCTION
When the House of Representatives’ chaplain Reverend
Patrick Conroy was dismissed in April 2018, theories as to why
he was fired abounded.1 Some thought that he was fired because
he was Catholic and because his religion was disfavored.2 Others
thought he was asked to resign for impliedly criticizing a regressive tax cut bill earlier in the congressional term.3
Little, if any, of the mainstream commentary countenanced
an argument that the practice of hiring a congressional pastor
violated the Constitution.4 Though the Constitution bars any
“establishment” of religion,5 the practice of having a pastor in
the House dates back to the First Congress and has been widely
accepted throughout American history.6
But this acceptance has not necessarily extended to other
circumstances in which prayers are offered with the imprimatur of government. Most recently, a split has developed among
the circuit courts as to the constitutionality of prayer at local

1
See Susan Davis and Tom Gjelten, Ryan’s Dismissal of House Chaplain Sparks
Outrage and Suspicion (NPR, Apr 27, 2018), online at http://www.npr.org/2018/04/27/
606428892/ryans-dismissal-of-house-chaplain-sparks-outrage-and-suspicion (visited Sept
21, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable).
2
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Elizabeth Dias, Ryan Reinstates House Chaplain
after Priest Decided to Fight Dismissal, NY Times A14 (May 3, 2018).
3
See Elizabeth Dias, House Chaplain Was Asked to Resign. He Still Doesn’t Know
Why. (NY Times, Apr, 26, 2018), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/us/
politics/patrick-conroy-paul-ryan-house-chaplain.html (visited Sept 21, 2018) (Perma
archive unavailable).
4
See, for example, Wendy Cadge and Laura R. Olson, How Does Congress’ Chaplain
Not Violate Separation of Church and State? (Newsweek, May 2, 2018), archived at
http://perma.cc/V9EM-2AQA (explaining that, while chaplaincies have been controversial at times, the law on congressional chaplains is well settled).
5
US Const Amend I.
6
See Town of Greece v Galloway, 572 US 565, 574–77 (2014).
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government meetings led exclusively by the leaders of local government themselves.7
On March 12, 2013, Nancy Lund sued Rowan County, North
Carolina for violating the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.8 Peter Bormuth filed a similar suit on August 30,
2013 against Jackson County, Michigan.9 Both suits presented
similar facts and legal theories. The respective plaintiffs attended
county board of commissioners meetings at which the commissioners themselves began the proceedings with prayer. These
prayers were frequently sectarian in nature, and the only religion represented was Christianity.10 Both plaintiffs sought relief
via 42 USC § 1983, arguing that the practice of beginning the
meeting with prayer established the religion of Christianity and
violated the First Amendment.11
The state of Establishment Clause doctrine is uncertain, especially as applied to legislative prayer.12 Though the Constitution
forbids Congress from making any “law respecting an establishment of religion,” the Court has not clarified how far this
prohibition extends beyond literal congressional lawmaking,
which has led to a doctrinal thicket of overlapping and at times
contradictory tests.13 The clause extends to state and local government through the Fourteenth Amendment and applies to
actions carried out by the state or state employees (not just
lawmaking).14

7
Compare Lund v Rowan County, 863 F3d 268, 275 (4th Cir 2017) (en banc) (holding that the legislature’s prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause), with
Bormuth v County of Jackson, 870 F3d 494, 498 (6th Cir 2017) (en banc) (holding that a
similar practice did not violate the Establishment Clause).
8
Complaint against Rowan County, Lund v Rowan County, No 1:13-CV-00207,
*1–2 (MD NC filed Mar 12, 2013) (Lund Complaint).
9
Complaint against County of Jackson, Bormuth v County of Jackson, No 2:13CV-13726, *1–2 (ED Mich filed Aug 30, 2013) (Bormuth Complaint).
10 Lund Complaint at *2 (cited in note 8); Bormuth Complaint at *2 (cited in note 9).
11 Lund Complaint at *2 (cited in note 8); Bormuth Complaint at *3 (cited in note 9).
12 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U Pa L Rev 59, 62
n 9 (2017) (noting that the leading legislative prayer case defies traditional Establishment
Clause approaches).
13 See id at 60 (“Establishment Clause doctrine is notoriously confused and disarrayed.”); Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8
U Pa J Const L 725, 725 (2006) (“It is by now axiomatic that the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is a mess—both hopelessly confused and deeply
contradictory.”). See also Rowan County v Lund, 138 S Ct 2564, 2564 (2018) (Thomas
dissenting) (“This Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in disarray.”).
14 For Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, see Everson v Board of Education
of the Township of Ewing, 330 US 1, 8 (1947). For extension beyond legislation, see,
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But in the two leading Supreme Court cases, legislative
prayer has been held to be constitutionally permissible. In
Marsh v Chambers,15 the Court upheld the Nebraska state legislature’s 100-year-old practice of hiring a pastor to deliver prayers
over a lengthy dissent by Justice William Brennan.16 More
recently, the Supreme Court decided Town of Greece v Galloway,17
which dealt with similar circumstances: a town invited local
clergy to deliver prayers at the beginning of the town council
meeting, and all of the invitees were Christian.18 The Court held
that this practice did not violate the Establishment Clause,
though no reasoning garnered a majority of the Court.19
Town of Greece did little to settle the legal terrain in the
pending claims in Lund’s and Bormuth’s respective lawsuits.
Following the Town of Greece decision, both cases went en banc
in their respective circuits, generating a total of nine opinions
sharply split on what legal test should be applied and on the
outcome.20 The two cases led to a circuit split as to whether sectarian prayer offered by a councilmember (as opposed to a third
party) is subject to a different legal standard than that outlined in Town of Greece.21 Although both cases, Lund v Rowan
County22 from the Fourth Circuit and Bormuth v County of

for example, Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577, 597–99 (1992) (holding that prayer by a rabbi
at a public school graduation violated the Establishment Clause).
15 463 US 783 (1983).
16 Id at 795 (Brennan dissenting).
17 572 US 565 (2014).
18 Id at 611–12 (Breyer dissenting) (noting that, between 1999 and 2007, the prayers
were exclusively Christian, and that thereafter, four non-Christian prayers were given
but only after the plaintiffs in the case complained).
19 See id at 567. See also id at 603–10 (Thomas concurring) (offering competing rationales for allowing the prayers in question).
20 See generally Lund, 863 F3d 268; Bormuth, 870 F3d 494.
21 Aside from the two cases constituting this split, others have recently addressed
the issue. See Williamson v Brevard County, 2017 WL 4404444, *14–19 (MD Fla) (discussing concerns with how the county selects prayer givers); Hudson v Pittsylvania
County, 107 F Supp 3d 524, 541 (WD Va 2015) (upholding an injunction prohibiting
councilmembers from delivering sectarian prayers at their meetings). Moreover, a majority of counties in the Fourth Circuit have allowed legislative-led prayer “on at least some
occasions.” Brief of Amici Curiae State of West Virginia and 12 Other States Supporting
Defendant-Appellant, Lund v Rowan County, No 15-1591, *15 (4th Cir filed Aug 3, 2015).
Information regarding legislative prayer is less consistently available for the Sixth Circuit,
but it appears as though it is widespread. For those counties from which information could
be gathered, almost 40 percent had legislator-led prayer. Brief of Amici Curiae State of
Michigan and Twenty-One Other States in Support of Jackson County and Affirmance,
Bormuth v County of Jackson, No 15-1869, *10–12 (6th Cir filed May 1, 2017).
22 863 F3d 268 (4th Cir 2017) (en banc).
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Jackson23 from the Sixth Circuit, were appealed to the Supreme
Court, certiorari was denied in both cases (over an impassioned
dissent by Justice Clarence Thomas in the former).24 It does not
appear as though the lower courts will have further guidance in
the near future.
This Comment seeks to untangle the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding legislative prayer by focusing on sectarian prayer offered by lawmakers in intimate settings (such
as municipal or county council meetings). Part I describes the
Establishment Clause and the legal standards applied by the
Court in various settings, focusing on prayer in particular. This
Comment considers the doctrinal wrinkles surrounding government and prayer through the lens of constitutional prophylactic
rules. Part II further homes in on the circuit split regarding
prayer led by lawmakers in intimate settings. Finally, Part III
offers a solution to this split, concluding that the Constitution
forbids legislative prayer in intimate forums in which the identity
of the prayer givers are directly determined by elections or other
direct political processes.
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND ITS ATTENDANT TESTS
The First Amendment to the US Constitution commands
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.”25 The Establishment Clause is binding on the states

23

870 F3d 494 (6th Cir 2017) (en banc).
See generally Lund, 138 S Ct 2564; Bormuth v Jackson County, 138 S Ct
2708 (2018).
25 US Const Amend I. The First Amendment also contains a provision ensuring
that Congress may not pass a law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion; the so-called
Free Exercise Clause is a doctrinally distinct provision, which is outside of the scope of
this Comment. Some, however, have astutely noted that there is one area of overlap between these two clauses that is especially germane to legislative prayer: the extent of the
coercion test that I describe below. Briefly, a government practice that coerces some form
of religious observance can be framed as either an establishment of religion or an infringement on others’ free exercise rights. Thus, some have even argued that the coercion test should be considered part of the Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence as
opposed to its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. While this line of reasoning raises
intriguing questions about the internal consistency of recent First Amendment decisions
and the meaning of a freestanding Establishment Clause that is in some applications
concomitant with Free Exercise jurisprudence, these issues are outside the scope of this
Comment. Regardless of whether or not coercion is the “right” Establishment Clause test
in some cases, it is what the Court has used. For a discussion of the view that the coercion test is subsumed within the Free Exercise Clause, see, for example, Lee v Weisman,
505 US 577, 604–09 (1992) (Blackmun concurring).
24
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through the Fourteenth Amendment.26 Thus, the clause applies
to state and local authorities.
Likewise, the Establishment Clause applies to policies and
practices, not just to legislation. Specifically, the Court has ruled
that prayer offered at government functions or with the imprimatur of the government may run afoul of the Constitution—
even if there is not a law establishing religion in and of itself.27
The Supreme Court has applied sundry tests to potential establishments of religion.28 Here, the most salient tests are the
Lemon test29 and the coercion test.30 These tests somewhat overlap, and though neither has been explicitly overruled or elevated
to primacy, the controlling opinion in Town of Greece relied primarily on the coercion test.31 In the legislative prayer context,
the Court also uses a third, somewhat amorphous, test: historical pedigree.32 There are several other tests, or permutations
thereof, that do not get consistently applied in the legislative
prayer context, including the endorsement33 and neutrality34
tests. The former is frequently seen as a variation of one of the
prongs of the Lemon test.35 The latter is a value that suffuses
each of the Court’s Establishment Clause decisions36 but can
sometimes be considered its own test, particularly when considering government practices and procedures that affect religious

26 Everson v Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 US 1, 8 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment Clause).
27 See Weisman, 505 US at 597–99 (holding that prayer offered at a public high
school graduation violated the Establishment Clause).
28 See Gey, 8 U Pa J Const L at 728 (cited in note 13). Professor Steven Gey counts
ten separate tests.
29 See Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 612–13 (1971).
30 See Weisman, 505 US at 587.
31 Town of Greece, 572 US at 589–90 (Kennedy) (plurality).
32 See, for example, Marsh, 463 US at 793.
33 See Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 691–94 (1984) (O’Connor concurring).
34 See Zelman v Simmons-Harris, 536 US 639, 649–53 (2002).
35 See, for example, Lynch, 465 US at 691–92 (O’Connor concurring). See also Doe v
Elmbrook School District, 687 F3d 840, 849–50 (7th Cir 2012) (en banc) (“In accord with
further Supreme Court precedent approving of the endorsement approach, . . . we have
viewed the endorsement test as a legitimate part of Lemon’s second prong.”); Allison
Hugi, Comment, A Borderline Case: The Establishment Clause Implications of Religious
Questioning by Government Officials, 85 U Chi L Rev 193, 206 (2018) (discussing the endorsement test).
36 See, for example, McCreary County v American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky,
545 US 844, 860 (2005) (“The touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the ‘First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’”).
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institutions or practices.37 In other words, these other tests are
useful in understanding the patchwork of the Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence but are not as comprehensive as the Lemon test and bear less directly on prayer at government functions.
A.

The Lemon Test

The Lemon test, announced in Lemon v Kurtzman,38 is a
three-part test to determine the constitutionality of a contested
law or practice.39 In order for a government activity to pass constitutional muster, per Lemon, (1) it “must have a secular legislative purpose,”40 (2) “its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion,”41 and (3) it “must not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”42
If the practice meets those three prongs, it is not a violation of the Establishment Clause per Lemon. In Lemon, the
Court ruled on the constitutionality of, among other things, a
Pennsylvania state statute. The statute “provide[d] financial
support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by way
of reimbursement for the cost of teachers’ salaries, textbooks,
and instructional materials in specified secular subjects”; in
reaching nonpublic schools, the statute funded secular as well as
religious institutions.43 The law required rigorous accounting as
to what money was being spent on which costs. For the first
Lemon prong, the Court reasoned that the legislation had a secular purpose, as the legislation purported to improve all nonpublic education.44 The Court declined to apply the second prong, as
the statute failed the third prong.45
The Court interpreted the third prong in two ways: First,
the state may not oversee and meddle in religious affairs.46
37 See, for example, Zelman, 536 US at 649–52 (noting that previous cases “thus
make clear that where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, . . .
the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.”). But
see Hugi, Comment, 85 U Chi L Rev at 206 (cited in note 35) (arguing that neutrality is
no more than a value and is therefore not a test).
38 403 US 602 (1971).
39 Id at 612–13.
40 Id at 612.
41 Id.
42 Lemon, 403 US at 613 (quotation marks omitted).
43 Id at 606–07.
44 Id at 613.
45 Id at 613–14.
46 Lemon, 403 US at 614–15.
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Second, a law may lead to entanglement if it has “divisive political potential.”47 The Pennsylvania statute failed this prong because the “restrictions and surveillance necessary” to comply
with the law fostered entanglements by forcing state actors to
police the accounting practices of religious schools.48
The divisive political potential aspect of the entanglement
prong can also apply in instances in which religion is intermingled
with majoritarian decision-making, such as voting. For example,
in Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe,49 the Court considered a public school district’s proposed policy of allowing students
to vote on who would give invocations at high school football
games.50 Although this aspect of the policy was officially neutral
toward religion, it nonetheless contravened the Establishment
Clause because it invited rancorous sectarianism.51
The immediacy of the decision-making is often relevant in deciding how divisive a government expression of religion is. This
thread in the divisiveness prong is illustrated by Van Orden v
Perry52 and McCreary County v American Civil Liberties Union
of Kentucky.53 Decided the same day, both cases involved a display of the Decalogue (also called the Ten Commandments) on
state property. Justice Stephen Breyer provided the critical fifth
vote in each case, voting to forbid Kentucky’s display in
McCreary County while opting to not mess with Texas’s in Van
Orden.54 He highlighted a couple distinguishing factors. First, the
Texas display did not advance a particular religion and was part
of a broader installation, whereas the Kentucky display was more
explicitly Christian and more focused on the Decalogue.55 Second,
47

Id at 622.
Id at 620–21.
49 530 US 290 (2000).
50 Id at 304–07. See notes 88–95 and accompanying text.
51 Santa Fe, 530 US at 309–10. Other cases have diminished the importance of the
third Lemon prong. See, for example, Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203, 221–22 (1997) (recasting the “entanglement” prong as part of the “secular purpose” prong).
52 545 US 677 (2005).
53 545 US 844 (2005).
54 See Van Orden, 545 US at 698 (Breyer concurring) (distinguishing the two displays).
55 See id at 701–03 (Breyer concurring) (explaining that the Texas Decalogue display
was donated by a largely secular organization as part of a park with thirty-eight monuments
and markers intended to illustrate Texas’s history and ideals, and that the text surrounding
the Decalogue was secular). In contrast, in McCreary County, the Decalogue was part of a
single display by itself, which was later augmented to include other components that furthered its religious nature, such as “an excerpt from President Lincoln’s ‘Reply to Loyal
Colored People of Baltimore upon Presentation of a Bible,’ reading that ‘[t]he Bible is the
best gift God has ever given to man.’” McCreary County, 545 US at 851–54.
48
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the Texas display had been around for decades, whereas the
decision-makers in Kentucky had only recently debated the monument’s content during a politically fraught approval process.56
Professor Richard Fallon explains Justice Breyer’s vote in the
case as standing for the proposition that long-standing government practices supporting religion are tolerable but that new attempts to bring in similar practices violate the Constitution.57 In
other words, the Court prefers to let sleeping dogs lie, while
newer or frequent changes to policy or content are viewed more
skeptically. Changes in the relationship between church and
state bring interdenominational and religious strife to the fore.
Encouraging politicians and voters to frequently revisit the political and constitutional compromises made yesteryear would
promote backlash from all quarters, paradoxically fomenting the
type of the divisiveness the Lemon test forbids.58
While the full Lemon test is erratically used in the Supreme
Court and doctrinal evolution began to erode it almost as soon
as it was announced,59 the themes embedded within it suffuse
the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. For example,
as this Part explains, the Court may turn to endorsement without applying the full Lemon test. Likewise, the Court balks at
judicial oversight of religious observance, lest it unnecessarily
“entangle” the government in others’ religious observance.60 Thus,
applying Lemon to a case like legislative prayer may superficially
seem simple but raises questions about when the courts should
become involved in policing long-standing practices.
B.

Prophylactic Rules and Coercion

The current case law distinguishes between two types of coercion: direct and indirect.61 Under current Supreme Court precedent, “The Establishment Clause . . . does not depend upon
56

See Van Orden, 545 US at 702–03; McCreary County, 545 US at 851–57.
Richard H. Fallon Jr, A Salute to Justice Breyer’s Concurring Opinion in Van
Orden v. Perry, 128 Harv L Rev 429, 431 (2014).
58 See id at 431–32.
59 See Gey, 8 U Pa J Const L at 731–32 (cited in note 13). See also Santa Fe, 530
US at 319–20 (Rehnquist dissenting) (describing Lemon’s “checkered career in the decisional law” of the Supreme Court).
60 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 586 (“The quest to promote a diversity of religious
views would require the town to make wholly inappropriate judgments about the number
of religions [it] should sponsor[,] . . . a form of government entanglement with religion
that is far more troublesome than the current approach.”) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).
61 See, for example, Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421, 430–31 (1962).
57
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any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated
by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion
whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not.”62 In other words, the threshold for passing the
coercion test is the lower bar of indirect coercion, and even state
laws that do not directly coerce religious behavior may violate
the First Amendment.63
The coercion test is frequently used to determine whether
prayers sponsored by the government or provided in government
fora violate the Establishment Clause. Unlike the Lemon test,
there are no formal criteria; instead the Court looks to the extent of supervision and social pressures to participate. In two
cases, the Court has held that even nonsectarian prayer can violate the Establishment Clause because it coerces participation.64
Both cases involved minors; however, the Court did not indicate
that the coercion test should be applied exclusively in situations
involving minors. This Comment considers the presence of minors along with other aspects of the Court’s review of these practices,65 but age alone fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the
Court’s reasoning and holdings in these cases. Rather, this
Comment suggests a complementary framework: prophylactic
rules.
The coercive prayer and legislative prayer cases both
evince the characteristics of constitutional prophylactic rules.
As argued by Professor David Strauss, prophylactic rules are
ubiquitous in constitutional jurisprudence; these rules are designed to be deliberately overinclusive to protect core constitutional values.66 Strauss’s seminal article focuses on the prophylactic rule in Miranda v Arizona,67 which requires police officers
to inform criminal suspects of their rights to remain silent and
consult counsel during custodial interrogations.68 While this
62

Id at 430.
But see Town of Greece, 572 US at 609–10 (Thomas concurring) (arguing that
most of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is misbegotten and that legal
coercion is a more appropriate test in most circumstances). See also note 126 for a discussion of the direct coercion test’s relevance as a controlling opinion. And see note 25 for
a discussion of the potential overlap between the coercion test and the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.
64 See Weisman, 505 US at 599; Santa Fe, 530 US at 317.
65 See notes 99, 230, and accompanying text.
66 See generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U Chi L
Rev 190 (1988).
67 384 US 436 (1966).
68 Id at 444.
63
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warning requirement cannot be found in the Fifth Amendment,
the Court nonetheless requires it because it helps guide lower
courts’ decision-making and avoids laborious factfinding about
whether the other aspects of the interrogation violated due
process.69 To use Strauss’s language, prophylactic rules like
Miranda are broader than the “real” constitutional provision
they are designed to enforce.70 Miranda itself bars otherwise legitimately obtained confessions from being used in court.
Another area of constitutional law with ubiquitous prophylactic rules is freedom of speech. The Court is extremely skeptical of content-based restrictions, applying a “nearly conclusive
presumption against [their] constitutionality.”71 This is not because the First Amendment itself distinguishes between
content-based and content-neutral speech restrictions.72 Rather,
the freedom of speech is a core constitutional value, and it is exceptionally difficult to discern what actually motivates legislatures when they make restrictions on speech content.73 Again,
the “real” constitutional provision is that Congress should not
write laws barring certain kinds of politically disfavored
speech74—but because courts cannot always determine what the
intention and effect are, the Court has established a strong
prophylactic rule disfavoring all content-based restrictions. The
analogy between prophylactic rules protecting the freedom of
speech and those prohibiting the establishment of religion is apt.
Both constitutional provisions are located within the First
Amendment and are designed (to a certain extent) to prevent a
majoritarian body from prescribing what thoughts and expressions are orthodox.75 These values are both core to American
democracy and easily subverted by pretextual legislation—and
are thus deserving of strong prophylactic protection.

69

See Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 205 (cited in note 66).
Id at 201–02.
71 Id at 198.
72 See US Const Amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech.”).
73 See Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 200 (cited in note 66).
74 See West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 642 (1943)
(“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”) (emphasis added).
75 See id.
70

154

The University of Chicago Law Review

[86:151

Across various constitutional contexts, prophylactic rules have
many of the same hallmarks.76 They consider the institutional
propensities and strengths of the various branches.77 Most importantly, when the constitutional provision in question would
require extensive judicial factfinding, or even judicial omniscience, the Court will establish a rule to avoid having to divine actors’ true motivations or subtle actions.78 These questions are
also weighed against the importance of the constitutional value
at stake.79 Likewise, the Court sometimes establishes a “prophylactic rule [that] operates in reverse”; such rules “uphold legislation that the ‘real’ Constitution would invalidate.”80 Similarly,
prophylactic rules in reverse consider the propensities of institutional actors.81 As this Section and Part II.B discuss, although
the government prayer cases discuss factual inquiries, the holdings and legal rules bear the hallmarks of prophylactic rules.
In Lee v Weisman,82 the Court held that nonsectarian religious prayers offered at a nonrequired school function still violate the Establishment Clause because they are coercive.83 A
rabbi offered an opening prayer at a middle school graduation.
The prayer’s content was broadly religious but not sectarian—
calling upon “God” and “Lord” but not discussing particularly
Jewish dogma or creed.84 The Court found government coercion
in the fact that this occurred at a school graduation: there are
already “heightened concerns” about coerced prayer in the public
school context; students had no obvious way to avoid participating or appearing to participate; and the school district’s “supervision and control” of the event placed public and peer pressure
on students to stand or maintain silence during the prayer.85
The Court did not rest its holding exclusively on the plaintiff’s
76 See Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 195–200, 204–05 (cited in note 66) (discussing
prophylactic rules in the context of custodial interrogations, pamphleteering, where
and about what people may protest, the First Amendment generally, and race-based
classifications).
77 See id at 208.
78 See id at 202 (discussing how the Court’s treatment of the ordinance at issue in
Police Department of the City of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92 (1972), illustrates an attempt to protect the government from discriminating against a particular point of view).
79 See id at 207–09.
80 Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 206–07 (cited in note 66), citing Oregon v Mitchell,
400 US 112 (1970) (providing an example of a prophylactic rule operating in reverse).
81 Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 204–05.
82 505 US 577 (1992).
83 Id at 586–87.
84 See id at 581–82.
85 Id at 592–93.
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age or the school-based setting, noting that any government coercion of religious practice would violate the Establishment
Clause.86 That is, the Court preferred to consider the totality of
the circumstances in determining whether students were coerced rather than resting its holding on the well-established
principle that classroom prayer is outright forbidden.87
The Court also recently applied the coercion test to find a
violation of the Establishment Clause in Santa Fe.88 In this case,
a student challenged the school district’s practice of allowing
students serving on the student council to deliver prayers prior
to each home football game.89 Applying the coercion principles
outlined in Weisman, the Court held that the prayer practice
was similar to that disallowed in Weisman.90
The Court also dismissed several potentially distinguishing
factors. First, though the school did not pick the speakers directly
(as in Weisman), the election of speakers through majoritarian
means “encourage[d] divisiveness along religious lines in a public
school setting” and therefore also ran afoul of the Constitution.91
Second, the Court dismissed the argument that student attendance at football games was less mandatory than attendance at a
high school graduation,92 reasoning that attendance at schoolsanctioned extracurricular activities is a normal part of student
life93 but further held that the prayers would still have been coercive even if attendance were “purely voluntary.”94 Although
the school district had a fallback option that did not mention
prayer at all, the Court also struck that provision down because
the rest of the policy was close enough to prayer.95
86

See Weisman, 505 US at 592.
See id at 596. See also generally William P. Marshall, The Constitutionality of
School Prayer: Or Why Engel v. Vitale May Have Had It Right All Along, 46 Cap U L
Rev 339 (2018) (arguing that Weisman and Santa Fe should never have introduced coercion and instead should have rested on an antidivisiveness rationale).
88 Santa Fe, 530 US at 310–12.
89 See id at 297–98. The policy was written as if the school board was anticipating
litigation and had several fallback options. For example, it allowed for sectarian prayer,
but should that policy be enjoined, the district’s policy would revert to allowing only nonsectarian prayer. Should that be enjoined, the policy would shift to allowing various
“messages,” “statements,” and “invocations.” Id.
90 See id at 305.
91 Id at 311.
92 Santa Fe, 530 US at 311–12.
93 Id.
94 Id at 312.
95 Id at 313–16 (invalidating an alternative policy that did not mention prayer but
nonetheless called for students to “solemnize” football games beforehand).
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These cases analyzed the legal issue through the lens of coercion, but they did not conduct any factual inquiries into
whether coercion actually occurred. In Santa Fe, the policies
were hypothetical—the policy had yet to be implemented, and no
prayers or meditations were offered.96 And in Weisman, the
Court did not engage in an extended analysis of how the choreography of the graduation and prayer content gave rise to a coercive environment.97 Indeed, in Weisman, the prayer was nonsectarian and only faintly religious, and there was no evidence
that the plaintiff was uncomfortable, let alone coerced.98
The Court’s spare treatment of the actual facts of these cases
supports the theory that the Court prefers to deploy prophylactic
rules in this area of law. The Court is ill-suited to analyze the
coercive potential in government-sponsored prayers because doing so requires a rich record and intensive factfinding into the
subjective mental states of those in attendance. An analysis of
coercion in fact would have to consider in isolation and in combination the motivations of the prayer-giving government entity,
its actions, and the subjective mental state of audience members. Thus, Justice Antonin Scalia was absolutely correct when
he wrote in dissent in Weisman that “the Court has gone beyond
the realm where judges know what they are doing” by dabbling
in “psychology practiced by amateurs.”99 But that is exactly the
point. Because courts lack the institutional capacity to determine
each actor’s motivations and sensitivities, the Court appropriately
laid out a strong prophylactic rule forbidding religious prayers
when children may be explicitly or implicitly cajoled into bending
their religious practices to meet those of school administrators.
The problem compounds in cases like Santa Fe, in which
prayers are to be repeated with regularity; presumably a reviewing court would have to inquire into the subjective mental states
of the prayer givers and attendees at each football game. Thus,
in each of these cases, the Court did not attempt to discern
whether anyone was actually coerced to do anything. Santa Fe is
especially instructive: the Court blocked the entire practice
prophylactically even though the policy had a fallback option
96 Santa Fe, 530 US at 314 (rejecting the idea that the prayer policy “cannot be invalidated on the basis of some ‘possibility or even likelihood’ of an unconstitutional application”).
97 Compare Weisman, 505 US at 593 (offering a high-level assertion that this was coercive based on assumed facts), with Town of Greece, 572 US at 588–90 (offering a very detailed discussion of what kinds of factors, taken together, could inform a coercion analysis).
98 See Weisman, 505 US at 581–83.
99 Id at 636 (Scalia dissenting).
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that did not even fully authorize prayer.100 As in the equal protection realm, majoritarian decision-making looms large over
the Establishment Clause, further explaining these prophylactic
rules; the Court is concerned that a majority group will use
seemingly neutral policies to discriminate against an outgroup.101
In sum, the strong prophylactic rules laid out in Weisman
and Santa Fe seem to cut wider than examining whether a government agent actually indirectly coerced somebody to participate in a religious activity. But these two cases do not make
clear what facts trigger this preclusive rule or whether the principles of coercion should also apply to legislative prayer. It is
also worth noting that, apart from Weisman and Santa Fe, the
Court has a robust line of cases that forbid religious expression
and instruction in public schools.102 These earlier cases do not
discuss indirect coercion as a rationale or test (and in some cases
explicitly set aside coercion), suggesting that the prophylactic
rules surrounding public prayer differ from the Court’s categorical ban on prayer in a public schoolhouse.103
II. LEGISLATIVE PRAYER AND LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER
In the two leading cases regarding legislative prayer, Town
of Greece and Marsh, the Supreme Court held the practices constitutional. The Court did not consistently apply any of the
above tests in these cases. In Marsh, the Court appeared to accept the practice as presumptively constitutional, based on the
First Congress hiring a pastor as it finalized the language of
what would become the Bill of Rights.104 In Town of Greece, the
controlling opinion applied a form of the “indirect coercion” test
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Santa Fe, 530 US at 308–09.
See Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 204–05 (cited in note 66).
102 See, for example, Engel, 370 US at 424; School District of Abington Township v
Schempp, 374 US 203, 223 (1963); Epperson v Arkansas, 393 US 97, 103 (1968); Wallace
v Jaffree, 472 US 38, 56 (1985). See also Engel, 370 US at 438–42 (Douglas concurring)
(explaining that coercion is not necessary to invalidate prayer in school).
103 See note 100 and accompanying text. See also Jaffree, 472 US at 72 (O’Connor
concurring) (explaining that earlier religion and school decisions “expressly turned only
on the fact that the government was sponsoring a manifestly religious exercise” notwithstanding any implicit coercion that may have been present). See also Marshall, 46 Cap U
L Rev at 341 (cited in note 87) (contrasting the rationales of earlier school prayer cases
with those of Weisman and Santa Fe).
104 Marsh, 463 US at 787–88.
101
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but failed to garner a majority of the Court.105 Each of these cases
considers prayers delivered by third parties. As such, no Court
case directly controls the factual circumstance that underlies this
Comment, namely legislators themselves leading prayer.
A.

Marsh v Chambers: A Carveout for Historical Practices

Though the Court has never held that the Lemon test is inapplicable to legislative prayer,106 it has strongly implied that its
applicability is at least limited when the practice has a long historical pedigree. In Marsh, the Nebraska state legislature paid a
pastor to deliver prayers at its legislative sessions.107 This practice was a century old,108 and the same Presbyterian pastor had
been retained for the two decades preceding suit.109 The prayers
were offered in the official legislative chamber before the official
start of the workday, and the legislators (let alone any observers) did not need to be present.110
The Court’s decision ignored the Lemon test except to note
that the lower court applied that test.111 Rather, the majority opinion in Marsh located the constitutionality of legislative prayer in
the First Congress, which also hired a pastor to deliver prayers
almost immediately after ratifying the First Amendment.112 The
Court did acknowledge that there were contemporaneous objections to legislative prayer during the process of constitutional
ratification and that two of the authors of the Federalist Papers
opposed the practice at various points in their respective careers.113 But Marsh downplayed these undercurrents and held

105 This Comment treats Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion, which applied the indirect coercion test, as the controlling plurality opinion under Marks v United States, 430
US 188 (1977). See note 126 and accompanying text.
106 See generally Town of Greece, 572 US 565; Marsh, 463 US 783.
107 See Marsh, 463 US at 784–85.
108 See id at 790.
109 See id at 785.
110 See Chambers v Marsh, 504 F Supp 585, 590 & n 12 (D Neb 1980).
111 See Marsh, 463 US at 786. See also id at 796 (Brennan dissenting).
112 See id at 787–88.
113 For contemporaneous objections, see id at 791 n 12 (“It also could be noted that
objections to prayer were raised, apparently successfully, in Pennsylvania while ratification of the Constitution was debated.”). For noncontemporaneous objections raised by
former President James Madison and then-delegate John Jay, see id at 791 & n 12; id at
807–08 (Brennan dissenting) (quoting Madison as writing, “Is the appointment of Chaplains to the two Houses of Congress consistent with the Constitution, and with the pure
principle of religious freedom? In strictness, the answer on both points must be in the
negative”).

2019]

Pressure to Pray?

159

that the practices of the First Congress are determinative.114 In
other words, the First Congress’s “actions reveal their intent”: if
hiring a minister to deliver prayers contravened the
Establishment Clause, they would not have done it.115
A forceful dissent by Justice Brennan argued that this history is not compelling and instead applied the Lemon test, finding
that legislative prayer fails on all three prongs. First, the purpose
of retaining a pastor is religious, and not secular, in nature.116 Second, the primary effect is to advance religion.117 Finally, legislative prayer fails both aspects of the final prong: the legislature
might have to police the pastor’s prayers to ensure that they do
not cross lines of acceptability, and the selection of pastors from
the several denominations and religions has “divisive political
potential.”118
B.

Town of Greece v Galloway

The most recent case—and source of the current circuit
split—regarding legislative prayer is Town of Greece. Greece, a
hamlet in upstate New York, instituted a prayer session at the
beginning of its town board meetings.119 The town followed an
“informal” method of identifying potential prayer-giving volunteers by calling up local religious institutions, finding someone
available to pray at that month’s meeting, and then compiling a
list of individuals available to be called on in the future.120 Until
litigation began, every volunteer prayer giver was Christian,
and many of the prayers were overtly sectarian.121 Later, a rabbi,
a Wiccan priestess, and a chairman of the local Baha’i temple
gave prayers at the town board meetings.122
The plaintiffs in the case sought to limit the holding of Marsh
and distinguished Greece’s practices in several ways. First, they
argued that Marsh authorized only nonsectarian prayer, whereas
Greece’s volunteers gave openly sectarian prayers.123 Second, the
114

See Marsh, 463 US at 792.
Id at 790.
116 See id at 797 (Brennan dissenting).
117 See id at 798 (Brennan dissenting).
118 Marsh, 463 US at 798–800 (Brennan dissenting).
119 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 570.
120 See id at 571.
121 See id.
122 See id at 572.
123 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 579, discussing County of Allegheny v American
Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 US 573 (1989).
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plaintiffs argued that the fact that only Christian leaders were
invited to give prayers ran afoul of the endorsement prong of the
Lemon test and the principle of government neutrality toward
religion.124 Finally, the prayers in Marsh occurred in a remote legislative chamber, whereas Greece held only town board meetings,
at which constituents openly petitioned their local representatives. Because citizens attended these intimate meetings to personally petition the board, a prayer at the beginning, the plaintiffs argued, was coercive.125
The Court rejected all three of these arguments in a five-tofour vote and held that Greece’s prayer practice passed constitutional muster. But the Court was nonetheless fractured: the case
generated five opinions, and a majority failed to coalesce around
a shared rationale on one key legal issue. Justice Kennedy wrote
the opinion of the Court on the first two questions, holding that
openly sectarian legislative prayer is constitutionally acceptable
and that, despite the imbalance in religious groups invited to lead
prayers, the selection process for prayer givers was neutral and
thus constitutional. While a majority of the Court found that the
practice was not coercive, they fractured on the rationale.126
Justice Elena Kagan wrote the primary dissent, joined by
the remaining justices, which argued that the prayers should
have been nonsectarian and that Greece should have solicited
prayers from more diverse clergy.127 The dissent also argued that
the location of a local government meeting is more coercive than
the legislative session at issue in Marsh.128 Justice Breyer dissented separately to explain all of the practical ways that Greece
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See Town of Greece, 572 US at 585.
See id at 585–86.
126 This Comment treats Justice Kennedy’s opinion as controlling. See, for example,
Lund, 863 F3d at 277 (en banc) (treating Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion as controlling without further discussion); Lund, 837 F3d at 416–17 (panel opinion) (same). See
also Bormuth, 870 F3d at 515 n 10 (implying that a majority of the en banc Sixth Circuit
agrees that Justice Kennedy’s opinion controls). There are, however, some who believe
that, under Marks, Justice Thomas’s concurrence should control on this final legal question. See, for example, Bormuth, 870 F3d at 515 n 10. It is outside the scope of this
Comment to fully grapple with this question, but there are very strong arguments that,
as a matter of logic and Marks itself, Justice Kennedy’s opinion is the one that binds
lower courts. See, for example, Bormuth, 870 F3d at 519–21 (Rogers concurring). Moreover, applying Justice Thomas’s proposed test would upend binding Supreme Court precedent, whereas Justice Kennedy’s acknowledgment of indirect coercion would not. See
Bormuth, 870 F3d at 540 n 9 (Moore dissenting).
127 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 631–32 (Kagan dissenting).
128 See id at 626–27 (Kagan dissenting).
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could have made its prayer practice more inclusive and, by his
lights, constitutional.129
A majority of the Court quickly rejected the plaintiffs’ first
two arguments. In response to the first, regarding sectarian
prayer, it noted that, in the actual Marsh case, many of the
prayers were overtly Christian.130 Moreover, requiring that the
prayer be nonsectarian would require the town and judiciary to
actively police the content of the prayer.131 But the Court explicitly withheld judgment on a hypothetical future case in which
“the invocations denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities,
threaten damnation, or preach conversion.”132
Second, a majority of the Court held that the method of identifying prayer givers did not violate governmental neutrality. The
Court explained that the method was neutral and reasonable:
“So long as the town maintains a policy of nondiscrimination, the
Constitution does not require it to search beyond its borders for
non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing.”133 In his concurrence, Justice Samuel Alito elaborated
that the method of identifying prayer givers was appropriate in
two respects: first, the policy was not born of “religious animus,”
and second, the town offered opportunities to non-Christians to
lead prayers once the lack of diversity was brought to their attention.134 In essence, the procedure for selecting prayer givers was
facially neutral, which is all that the Constitution requires.135 A
majority of the court also found that Greece’s prayer practice,
though implemented only in the 1990s, was justifiable due to its
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See id at 612–14 (Breyer dissenting).
See id at 580–81 (Kennedy) (plurality).
131 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 580–81; id at 595 (Alito concurring). While the
majority and concurring opinions do not cite the Lemon test, they do seem concerned
with potential religious entanglements. See Lemon, 403 US at 620–21 (prohibiting monitoring practices that “entangle” the state with religious practice). Justice Kagan countered that, in Marsh, the prayer giver stopped giving sectarian prayers when asked, and
“the Court would have reached a different decision” in that case if the prayers had been
given to “advance any one . . . faith.” Town of Greece, 572 US at 627 (Kagan dissenting).
132 Town of Greece, 572 US at 583.
133 Id at 567.
134 Id at 593–94 (Alito concurring).
135 Writing in dissent, Justice Kagan argued that, regardless of the methods used to
identify prayer givers, “prayer repeatedly invoking a single religion’s beliefs . . . crossed a
constitutional line.” Id at 618 (Kagan dissenting). Also, note the contrast between Justice
Alito’s reasoning and Santa Fe, which condemned a facially neutral method of selecting a
prayer giver because of concerns over majoritarianism. See Santa Fe, 530 US at 311, 316–
17. See also Part III.B below (distinguishing Town of Greece and Santa Fe because, in the
former, the facially neutral process does not directly rely on majoritarian decision-making).
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similarity to other accepted policies.136 The Court echoed Marsh’s
reasoning that practices adopted by the First Congress, such as
sectarian prayer, are presumptively constitutional.137 A majority of
the Court also found that there is a historical precedent for prayer
in small-town board meetings.138 Thus, the practice’s historical
pedigree shielded it from the exacting constitutional scrutiny
embodied in traditional Establishment Clause tests such as
Lemon.139
The majority hints, however, that historical pedigree may
be qualified by other Establishment Clause tests: “Any test the
Court adopts must acknowledge a practice that was accepted by
the Framers and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and
political change.”140 In other words, the Court acknowledges that
historicity is not the be-all and end-all of legislative prayer and
that other Establishment Clause tests may be appropriate. Indeed, the controlling plurality opinion went on to analyze
Greece’s prayer practice in light of the coercion test, suggesting
that, while historicity is important to the Court’s analysis, it is
not necessarily sufficient to find instances of legislative prayer
constitutional.141
This final issue facing the Court—whether the practice of
sectarian prayer (offered by a third party) at a local government
meeting was coercive to citizens in attendance—proved more
controversial, with no opinion commanding a majority of the
Court. The controlling opinion, written by Justice Kennedy,142
employed a broad indirect coercion analysis of the town’s prayer
practice.143 Justice Thomas agreed, on other grounds, that the
prayers were constitutional, thus supplying a majority.144
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But see Fallon, 128 Harv L Rev at 431 (cited in note 57).
Town of Greece, 572 US at 575–79.
138 Id at 576.
139 See Lisa Shaw Roy, The Unexplored Implications of Town of Greece v. Galloway,
80 Albany L Rev 877, 879–80 (2016) (collecting scholarly reactions and discussing the
history argument).
140 Town of Greece, 572 US at 577.
141 Id at 584–92.
142 See note 126 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of why this Comment
treats this opinion as controlling.
143 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 584–92.
144 Id at 608–10 (Thomas concurring) (arguing that the only valid form of a coercion
test is examining whether anybody was directly and legally coerced by the government).
Justice Kagan dissented, contending that the intimate environs of a local government
meeting were dissimilar from a legislative session in a capitol building and more likely
to lead to indirect coercion to participate. Id at 625–31 (Kagan dissenting).
137
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Justice Kennedy, in the plurality opinion, explained that,
because the prayers were not directed at the noncouncilmembers, they cannot be coercive. Quoting the district
court in Marsh, Justice Kennedy explained that legislative prayer
as an “internal act” is permissible under the Establishment
Clause.145 In this context, “internal” means primarily for an audience of other legislators.146 Since the prayers in Greece were
also “internal” in the sense that they were primarily to “accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers and connect them to a
tradition dating to the time of the Framers,” they thus fell into
the set of practices recognized and allowed in Marsh.147 Justice
Kennedy’s opinion distinguished this case from Weisman and
Santa Fe by noting that any offended person in attendance could
simply leave for the prayer and return to the board meeting once
the prayer concluded.148 Whereas the students in Weisman and
Santa Fe were arguably required to attend and their behavior
may have been monitored, here the meeting’s attendees were
adults who were not required to participate in or even attend a
prayer that offended their religious sensibilities.149 This plurality
opinion, however, explicitly withheld judgment on several factual
wrinkles not presented, noting that, despite the holding in Town
of Greece, “[t]he inquiry remains a fact-sensitive one that considers both the setting in which the prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed.”150 Most importantly, the Court did
not address a situation in which “town board members directed
the public to participate in the prayers, singled out dissidents for
opprobrium, or indicated that their decisions might be influenced
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Id at 587 (Kennedy) (plurality), quoting Chambers, 504 F Supp at 588.
See Town of Greece, 572 US at 588.
147 Id.
148 See id at 590 (“Nothing in the record suggests that members of the public are
dissuaded from leaving the meeting room during the prayer, arriving late, or even, as
happened here, making a later protest.”). See also id at 594 (Alito concurring):
146

The prayer preceded only the portion of the town board meeting that I view as
essentially legislative. While it is true that the matters considered by the board
during this initial part of the meeting might involve very specific questions,
such as the installation of a traffic light or stop sign at a particular intersection, that does not transform the nature of this part of the meeting.
149 See id at 590–91. The various opinions, including the dissents, also do not address the possibility that religious minorities may feel coerced to participate, not because
they feel uncomfortable individually but because they worry about how the incident may
lead to a backlash against all members of that minority group.
150 Town of Greece, 572 US at 587.
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by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”151 Similarly,
the plurality implied that prayer that “chastised dissenters [or]
attempted lengthy disquisition on religious dogma” would be
impermissible.152 As the Fourth Circuit later noted in Lund,
“[T]he decision takes for granted the use of outside clergy.”153
The holding of Town of Greece, that inoffensive sectarian
prayers offered by third parties are constitutional, supports the
view that the Court’s prayer and coercion jurisprudence is dominated by prophylactic rules. In Marsh, the Court established
that legislative prayer is generally constitutional so long as it
hews relatively closely to what was practiced at the Founding.
The holding in Town of Greece can therefore be understood as a
prophylactic rule in reverse—allowing a practice that may violate the “real” Constitution in order to prevent judges from having to parse the theological significance and coercive potential of
every meditation offered by a third party.154 Thus, the plaintiffs’
desired solution of examining prayer content and allowing only
nonsectarian prayers is actually at odds with the spirit of
Weisman and Santa Fe. Although the Court said in dicta that
the coercion inquiry for legislative prayer is fact-sensitive, the
controlling opinion nonetheless also establishes a strong presumption that, when a third party is giving prayers, the prayers are constitutional.155
The holding in Town of Greece therefore aligns with the other
government prayer decisions. As in Santa Fe and Weisman, the
controlling opinion in Town of Greece does not meaningfully address whether someone actually felt coerced to participate; the
discussion was conclusory and theoretical.156 The Court rests its
conclusion on the observation that adults are generally hearty
enough that they can withstand peer pressure and a subtly offensive environment engendered by the legislators’ presence.157 Thus,
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Id at 588.
Id at 589–90.
153 Lund, 863 F3d at 278.
154 See Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 206–07 (cited in note 66) (explaining how Oregon
v Mitchell, 400 US 112 (1970), provides an example of a prophylactic rule operating in
reverse).
155 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 589–90.
156 See id at 590–91 (dismissing the plaintiffs’ objections to the practice because they
could not point to specific instances of coercion—despite the fact that the Court found
coercion present on even sparser records in Weisman and Santa Fe).
157 Id at 589 (“Offense . . . does not equate to coercion. Adults often encounter speech
they find disagreeable; and an Establishment Clause violation is not made out any time
152
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someone might actually feel coerced but be unable to overcome
the presumption so long as the legislators or third-party prayer
givers do not engage in a pattern of overt coercion. But if the
Court is to protect the holding in Marsh and prevent extended
and potentially error-prone judicial review, minor constitutional
violations, such as an adult feeling pressure to participate in a
prayer, may be tolerated.158 Whereas in Santa Fe and Weisman,
the Court arguably held practices that did not violate the “real”
Constitution unconstitutional, here the Court did the opposite,
allowing a practice that may actually be indirectly coercive.
C.

Circuit Split regarding Sectarian Prayer Delivered by Local
Government Representatives

The Town of Greece decision in many ways created more
questions than it answered. In particular, the plurality opinion’s
insistence that the inquiry is “fact sensitive” and that its holding
should not be read to extend to other factual circumstances left
lower courts wondering which circumstances are permissible
and which are not.159 Town of Greece also failed to answer what
constitutional tests courts should employ. Beyond mentioning
that these situations exist, Town of Greece provided lower courts
with few tools for responding to new fact patterns.160
The circuit split between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits regarding prayer led by local government representatives themselves highlights this lacuna. In Lund, the Fourth Circuit held
that one county’s practice of legislator-led prayer violated the
Establishment Clause,161 but in Bormuth, the Sixth Circuit
found a generally similar practice to be constitutional.162 These
two cases resulted in a flurry of opinions; the majorities in each
circuit understood the holding of Town of Greece differently, and
the two circuits came to opposite conclusions despite confronting
similar factual circumstances.163 On the one hand, the Fourth
a person experiences a sense of affront from the expression of contrary religious views in
a legislative forum.”).
158 See Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 205–07 (cited in note 66).
159 Town of Greece, 572 US at 587.
160 See note 132 and accompanying text.
161 See Lund, 863 F3d at 290.
162 See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 498.
163 But see id at 512–13, 518 (distinguishing the factual circumstances in the two
cases as a possible explanation for the distinct results). Though the content of the prayers on the record necessarily differs, that is insufficient grounds for distinguishing the
cases. As Parts II.C.1–2 discuss in greater detail, the two courts read Town of Greece
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Circuit considered several factors mentioned by the Town of
Greece opinion to fashion a new totality of the circumstances
standard that generally disfavors sectarian prayers led by councilmembers, regardless of whether or not participants actually
felt coerced. On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit held that the
legal test from Town of Greece fully controls instances of prayer
led by councilmembers. Moreover, in order to show that a practice is unconstitutionally coercive, plaintiffs must demonstrate
that the councilmembers engaged in retaliatory behavior.
1. Fourth Circuit: totality of the circumstances test
through the lens of the prayer giver’s identity.
In Lund, the Rowan County, North Carolina Board delivered invocations before their meetings for years and did not allow others to deliver an invocation.164 The prayers in question
were “pointedly sectarian” in that they exclusively referenced the
Christian faith, and some of the prayers “veered from time to
time into overt proselytization.”165 Some of the prayers included
requests for attendees to join in, and the setting was akin to
that of Town of Greece rather than Marsh in that it was a meeting of local government, not the state legislature in the state
capitol.166
The Fourth Circuit’s en banc opinion considered instances of
legislator-led prayer to be broadly governed by the holding and
tests in Town of Greece. It noted that, per Town of Greece, a
court determining the constitutionality of a prayer practice
“must conduct a ‘fact-sensitive’ review of ‘the setting in which
the prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed’” rather than applying another Establishment Clause test such as
Lemon.167 Moreover, it applied dicta from Town of Greece, which
explained that a few stray prayers that denigrate religious minorities or nonbelievers do “not despoil a practice that on the
whole reflects and embraces our tradition. Absent a pattern of
very differently and applied different legal tests. Moreover, there is reason to think that
the practices and religious content of the two counties’ prayers were not so dissimilar.
See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 525–26 (Moore dissenting). Finally, as discussed below, this
Comment argues that neither circuit’s approach is especially workable or consistent with
the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
164 See Lund, 863 F3d at 272.
165 Id. Though the board members were all Protestant Christians, they were not all
of the same denomination. Id at 282.
166 Id at 272.
167 Id at 281, quoting Town of Greece, 572 US at 587.
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prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on
the content of a prayer will not likely establish a constitutional
violation.” 168
The court converted these instructions to a totality of the
circumstances test centered on the practice of the county board.
Specifically, it examined four aspects of the prayers in turn and
together: (1) “commissioners as the sole prayer-givers,”
(2) “invocations that drew exclusively on Christianity and sometimes served to advance that faith,” (3) “invitations to attendees
to participate,” and (4) “the local government setting.”169
With respect to items (2)–(4), the Fourth Circuit found it
particularly important that the prayer givers were exclusively
board members.170 It is worth noting that these latter three factors were also present in Town of Greece: until the litigation began, the prayers in Greece were exclusively Christian, the prayer
givers often invited those in attendance to participate, and the
town meetings were intimate local government meetings.171 The
Lund court then held that “it is the combination of these elements—not any particular feature alone—that” violated the Establishment Clause.172
The Lund court first distinguished Town of Greece, in which
there was a facially neutral and open prayer-giving policy. Ultimately, a Wiccan priestess (among others) requested to give a
prayer and was afforded the opportunity to do so.173 In Lund, in
contrast, the board members refused to give any third parties
the opportunity to give prayers at the beginning of the meeting.174
This, the court held, thus contravenes the Town of Greece justification for the prayer practice—that it was open to majority and
minority religions alike (and was thus neutral).175
Here, the court also discussed the applicability of the third
Lemon prong: that the prayer practice should not foster “political

168 Town of Greece, 572 US at 585. See also Lund, 863 F3d at 283, quoting Town of
Greece, 572 US at 585.
169 Lund, 863 F3d at 281.
170 Id.
171 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 578–79.
172 Lund, 863 F3d at 281.
173 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 572.
174 See Lund, 863 F3d at 282.
175 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 585–86 (“So long as the town maintains a policy of
nondiscrimination, the Constitution does not require it to search beyond its borders for
non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing.”).

168

The University of Chicago Law Review

[86:151

division.”176 Without discussing Santa Fe, Lund noted that the
prayer practice became a controversial topic at the 2016 board
elections, and one person who “‘expressed opposition to the
Board’s prayer practice’ was booed and jeered by the audience”
of other community members.177 Though the threads of these arguments are not altogether lucid in the en banc opinion, the
thrust appears to be that having sectarian prayer given exclusively by the councilmembers violates both the neutrality principle from Town of Greece and the political divisiveness principle
from Lemon.178
The Lund opinion then examined three factors from Town of
Greece in light of the fact that the legislators themselves were
leading the prayers. First, in Town of Greece, the controlling
opinion instructed, “[A]dult citizens . . . can tolerate and perhaps
appreciate a ceremonial prayer delivered by a person of a different faith” and thus allowed sectarian prayer delivered by third
parties that is not belligerent.179 In viewing the prayer content
through the lens of the prayer givers’ status as government representatives, the Lund court looked at similar prayer content
and found the prayers problematic. Specifically, the prayers at
issue in Lund were also almost exclusively Christian and were
occasionally confrontational to non-Christians.180 The Lund
court first suggested that the prayers at issue were more confrontational than those in Town of Greece181 then noted that,
when recited by agents of the government, the sectarian nature
of the prayers becomes a potential establishment of religion.182
Next, the Lund court focused on the distinction from Town
of Greece that noted that invitations to participate in prayers
from the legislators themselves are expressly not protected by
the Town of Greece opinion.183 The Lund court first looked at
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See Lund, 863 F3d at 282.
Id.
178 The opinion also does not explain why the prayer practice in Town of Greece did
not fail the Lemon test given that it too sowed political discord. See Town of Greece, 572
US at 614–15 (Breyer dissenting); id at 636 (Kagan dissenting).
179 Id at 584 (Kennedy) (plurality).
180 See Lund, 863 F3d at 284–86 (quoting prayers, for example: “[W]e do believe that
there is only one way to salvation, and that is Jesus Christ”; “We can’t be defeated, we
can’t be destroyed, and we won’t be denied, because of our salvation through the Lord
Jesus Christ”).
181 See id. But see id at 314 (Agee dissenting) (noting that many of the prayers in
Town of Greece are similar to those criticized in the majority opinion).
182 See id at 286.
183 See id at 286–87.
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whom the calls were directed toward—the other councilmembers
or the citizens in attendance.184 Looking at the record, it found
that the calls were often directed to those in attendance, meaning that government agents exhorted not just themselves but
others to participate in sectarian prayer.185 The Lund majority
also remarked offhandedly that this issue on its own may be
dispositive in favor of those challenging the prayer practice.186
Finally, whereas the prayers in both Town of Greece and
Lund took place in local government meetings, the Lund court
distinguished the practices at two levels. First, it noted that,
when prayer givers are the councilmembers themselves, leaving
the meeting for the duration of the prayer does more to marginalize the dissident.187 It is not clear from the opinion, however,
what exactly the mechanism of marginalization is and whether
it would have been present in Town of Greece as well. Second,
Lund distinguishes the facts of Town of Greece, noting that in
the latter there was a clearer separation between prayer and
lawmaking, making it easier for objectors to leave without the
council immediately making decisions about various petitioners
as soon as the prayers concluded.188 The Lund majority opinion
then concluded that legislative prayer, as practiced in Rowan
County, violated the Establishment Clause.189
2. Sixth Circuit: elevating history and downplaying the
prayer giver’s position.
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit found that a practice similar
to that discussed above was constitutional.190 As in Lund,
Jackson County commissioners delivered prayers on a rotating
basis, prayers were exclusively Christian, and the commissioners often instructed citizens in attendance to participate.191 In
Bormuth, some of the councilmembers were openly antagonistic
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See Lund, 863 F3d at 287.
See id.
186 Id at 277, quoting Town of Greece, 572 US at 588 (“[T]he analysis would be different if town board members directed the public to participate in the prayers.”) (emphasis added).
187 See Lund, 863 F3d at 288.
188 See id. See also Town of Greece, 572 US at 593–94 (Alito concurring).
189 Lund, 863 F3d at 290–91.
190 See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 498.
191 See id at 498–99.
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to a person who complained about the practice, though there
may have been alternative justifications for their disfavor.192
The Sixth Circuit applied a different legal standard than
the Fourth Circuit to arrive at its alternate conclusion: it placed
great weight on the historical pedigree of legislative prayer generally193 and then considered whether the situations described in
Town of Greece differed in other ways beyond the identity of the
prayer giver.194
Specifically, the Sixth Circuit applied the coercion test with
regard to three facts in the record: the councilmembers requested
audience participation, the councilmembers turned their backs
on Mr. Bormuth during the hearings, and the council declined to
appoint Mr. Bormuth to various citizens’ boards.195 As in Lund,
the Bormuth majority used Town of Greece as its starting point
but read the decision to broadly license all forms of legislative
prayer. The primary frame of its analysis was not the distinction
between councilmembers and local pastors (as in Lund) but rather the historical pedigree of legislative prayer generally.196
First, the Bormuth court disregarded Town of Greece’s dicta
regarding the differences between requests to participate coming
from clergy and councilmembers: “We do not think there is a
constitutional difference here, for government-sanctioned prayers by official chaplains or invited community members still fall
within the ambit of the Establishment Clause.”197 It explained
Town of Greece’s distinction by hypothesizing that Town of
Greece contemplated individualized commands for objectors to
participate.198
Second, the Bormuth court observed that, though some
councilmembers criticized Mr. Bormuth and turned their backs
on him, they may not have done so because of his criticism of
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See id at 517–18.
See id at 504.
194 See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 512.
195 See id at 517.
196 See id at 510 (criticizing the opinion in Lund because it did not account for historical instances of legislator-led prayer).
197 Id at 517.
198 The majority approvingly cited a district court opinion that found an Establishment
Clause violation when councilmembers ordered the forcible ejection of people who respectfully refused to participate in a premeeting prayer. See id, citing Fields v Speaker of
the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 251 F Supp 3d 772, 776, 788 (MD Pa 2017). The
opinion does not, however, describe how forcible ejection differs from Justice Thomas’s
higher direct coercion bar. See note 63. Bormuth also did not discuss Weisman and Santa
Fe despite the fact that they are part of the Court’s coercion jurisprudence.
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their prayers. Rather, Mr. Bormuth was confrontational with
the councilmembers, both about the prayer practice and other
issues in front of the council.199 Regardless, the Bormuth court
reasoned, a few statements and actions do not make a pattern so
as to run afoul of Town of Greece.200
Finally, the Bormuth court placed the burden of proving coercion on Mr. Bormuth. Thus, Town of Greece explained that legislative prayer’s historical pedigree will generally insulate it
from thinly supported allegations of indirect coercion. Although
the Bormuth court acknowledged that the councilmembers disliked Mr. Bormuth’s complaints about the prayers, it concluded,
“Bormuth failed to put forth any evidence tying his objection to
the invocations to the Board’s decision to not appoint him to the
[requested committee], and [it] therefore g[a]ve no weight to this
allegation.”201
***
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion recast Town of Greece as a broad
opinion with applicability across myriad contexts. While determinations about legislative prayer remain fact-sensitive processes, there is a strong presumption of constitutionality so long
as the practice is generally tied to the historical roots of legislative prayer.202 This approach ignores the dicta in the Town of
Greece plurality opinion itself that specifically limited the holding of the case. Finally, in order to prevail on a coercion claim, a
plaintiff must show that the legislators took specific retaliatory
action, unlike in Weisman or Santa Fe, in which indirect coercion could be presumed from the circumstances.
In contrast, Lund established a fact-intensive totality of the
circumstances test that relies heavily on the dicta in Town of
Greece.203 The court emphasized the inherent divisiveness in
having prayers offered by elected representatives and the fact
that elevating a single religion in the public sphere amounts to
199

Bormuth, 870 F3d at 517–18.
Id at 518.
201 Id at 519.
202 The opinion also suggested that discriminatory procedures for selecting prayer
givers would violate the Constitution as well. See id at 514 (citing Lund and suggesting
that the constitutional minimum for neutrality is nondiscrimination).
203 See Lund, 863 F3d at 281. It is worth noting that Bormuth also attempted to distinguish Lund on the facts, describing the prayers in Lund as more sectarian and confrontational. Bormuth, 870 F3d at 512–13, 518. Regardless, the two opinions use very
different reasoning and announce quite dissimilar tests.
200
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endorsement.204 This dynamic changes the historically sanctioned
practice described in Town of Greece into something that invites
greater inquiry.205 As such, Lund hints at the possibility that
having government prayer givers brings the practice of legislative prayer closer to the ambit of traditional Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.206
III. RETHINKING COERCION AND FACT-SPECIFIC INQUIRIES
This Part argues that both circuits’ approaches to this issue
are unworkable or at odds with Supreme Court precedent. The
Sixth Circuit established a fairly simple bright-line rule to determine whether a practice is coercive: there must be a pattern
of singling out or openly punishing dissidents. The problem
with this approach is that it ignores much of the plurality opinion in Town of Greece and sweeps aside other parts of the
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Specifically, it
does not grapple with the ways in which sectarian prayer led by
councilmembers may be categorically more divisive or coercive
than those led by a local religious leader or other disinterested
third party—facts that Town of Greece seems to contemplate.207
The Fourth Circuit’s test suffers from a more fundamental
fault: it is almost impossible to apply.208 The Fourth Circuit calls
for weighing and reweighing almost every factor discussed and
disposed with in Town of Greece. At the very least, Town of
Greece established a presumption of constitutionality in the
mine-run case in which the legislators themselves did not get
involved. Lund’s analysis, however, is not pellucid and seems to
apply to only the set of facts presented in the case. Requiring en
banc review for any prayer or combination of prayers would defeat a central theme that animated the Town of Greece majority:

204 For divisiveness, see Lund, 863 F3d at 275, quoting Lemon, 403 US at 622. For
endorsement and neutrality, see Lund, 863 F3d at 280, quoting Larson v Valente, 456
US 228, 244 (1982) (“[T]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”).
205 See Lund, 863 F3d at 280.
206 Part III.B discusses this possibility further.
207 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 588–89.
208 See Paris Adult Theatre I v Slaton, 413 US 49, 83–94 (1973) (Brennan dissenting) (explaining that, when the majority of the Court fails to announce a simple legal
rule in such fact-sensitive circumstances, it can lead to confusion, chilling of constitutional behavior, and unnecessary appeals).
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that governments and courts should, by and large, steer away
from policing the specifics of legislative prayer.209
This Part suggests a solution to this split that alleviates
many of these problems. First, this Part extends the insight that
the Court seeks to prevent fact-specific reviews by fully fleshing
out the structure of constitutional prophylactic rules in legislative prayer.210 Thinking about the Court’s prayer cases as overlapping prophylactic rules then leads to the obvious question of
where the borderline cases of legislator-led prayer fit in. The
Sixth Circuit held that they should be treated identically to Town
of Greece and that there should be a strong presumption of their
constitutionality.211 But the opinion in Bormuth did not consider
whether another prophylactic rule would be appropriate.
The correct prophylactic rule should be that legislative
prayer led predominantly by councilmembers in these intimate
environs is unconstitutional. Town of Greece accepted that prayers led by councilmembers themselves are distinguishable from
the practice deemed constitutional in that case.212 And in Santa
Fe, the Court recognized that mingling majoritarian decisionmaking with prayer creates a divisive political potential, thus
violating the Lemon test.213 Moreover, this is a practical solution
that balances two conflicting strains in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. While legislative prayer offered by third parties
was declared presumptively constitutional in Town of Greece,
the Court is also skeptical of practices that enmesh majoritarian
decision-making with religious establishments.214
A.

Limitations of the Extant Circuit Opinions

As discussed above, the Court’s government prayer cases
bear the hallmarks of constitutional prophylactic rules.215 The
Court is, on the one hand, willing to apply very strong medicine to
prevent even ecumenical or nonsectarian prayers from being uttered with the government’s imprimatur in the presence of teenagers. But on the other hand, it employs a reverse prophylactic
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Town of Greece, 572 US at 579–82.
See generally Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 190 (cited in note 66).
211 See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 509–14, 519.
212 See Lund, 863 F3d at 278.
213 Santa Fe, 530 US at 310–11.
214 See notes 74–75 and accompanying text (discussing other areas of First Amendment
law in which the Court is skeptical of majoritarian decision-making).
215 See Part I.B.
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rule with regard to third-party delivered prayers at constituentfacing government functions. In this context, the Court is willing
to countenance far more sectarian prayers so long as the prayers
are not outrageous and the custom is arguably similar to that
practiced by the First Congress.
Neither of the circuits that have reviewed the constitutionality of legislator-led prayer has grappled with the tension between these strains in the Court’s prayer jurisprudence, or the
fact that they appear to be strong prophylactic rules operating in
tension. Their analyses are therefore unsatisfactory because the
opinions do not recognize that this area of the law is structured to
prevent extended factual reviews and may turn on seemingly minute details.
The Fourth Circuit’s approach in Lund therefore violates
the tenor of the Court’s prayer jurisprudence. It requires trial
courts to laboriously consider the evidence before them about
the denominational breakdown of the prayers as a whole, how
exhortative each prayer was, and whether councilmembers invited citizen attendees to participate.216 In its application, the
court had to determine whether “the invocations crossed the line
from ‘reflect[ing] upon shared ideals and common ends,’ . . . to
‘promot[ing] a preferred system of belief.’” 217 This is a subjective
inquiry that relies on extensive judicial factfinding, not just into
the words of the prayers but also into how those words were delivered and received by those in attendance.218
The totality of the circumstances test announced in Lund
will prove unworkable.219 While it cites dicta in Town of Greece
to elucidate what factors reviewing courts are supposed to use to
analyze the constitutionality of prayers,220 it takes that dicta too
much at face value. Here, weighing those factors without any
presumption one way or the other because the prayer givers are
216

See Lund, 863 F3d at 281.
Id at 284, quoting Town of Greece, 572 US at 581, 583.
218 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 589–90 (discussing how to discern between “internal” and “external” prayers). See also Lund, 863 F3d at 282–86 (discussing how the
content of the prayer would likely be received by those in the audience).
219 See generally, for example, Recent Case, Fourth Circuit Holds That County
Commissioners’ Practice of Offering Sectarian Prayers at Public Meetings Is Unconstitutional,
131 Harv L Rev 626 (2017) (criticizing the en banc opinion for announcing a difficult to
apply test that is insufficiently grounded in Establishment Clause doctrine). But see
generally John Gavin, Comment, Praying for Clarity: Lund, Bormuth, and the Split over
Legislator-Led Prayer, 59 BC L Rev E Supp 104 (2018) (suggesting that Town of Greece
called for a fully fleshed-out factual analysis for all challenges to legislative prayer).
220 See Lund, 863 F3d at 278.
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legislative actors requires courts to make difficult judgment
calls based on hard-to-discern facts. Moreover, the Court’s guidance about what types of prayers are acceptable is inconsistent
and thus cannot provide meaningful instruction to lower courts
if they seek to weigh multiple factors.221 For example, at what
point do children’s presence turn an acceptable legislative prayer
into something unacceptable?222 Similarly, Town of Greece instructs that isolated incidents of proselytization are tolerable,
but where should lower courts draw the line—while also factoring in the agenda of the meeting, identity of the prayer giver,
wording of the invitations to participate, and any other myriad
factual details mentioned in passing in various cases?223
Although the Sixth Circuit recognizes that Town of Greece
created a presumption of constitutionality with third-party legislative prayer, it fails to situate the opinion in the broader
Establishment Clause context. Weisman and Santa Fe show that
in generally similar circumstances, some factual tweaks, such as
the presence of children for school-related reasons, can lead to a
broad preclusive rule against prayers’ constitutionality.224 At the
very least, this hair-trigger quality requires courts to be attentive to potentially distinguishing details. Moreover, Town of
Greece invites lower courts to limit the case to its facts by specifically describing the holding as narrow with regard to the prayer
practice in that town.225 The Court also invited lower courts to reconsider the applicability of the Town of Greece opinion in dissimilar situations (but did not tell them how to weigh any of the mentioned factors).226
There are also practical reasons to suspect that the Court
does not intend for Town of Greece to be read broadly. In the
221 See notes 150–56 and accompanying text (describing the caveats in the plurality
opinion in Town of Greece).
222 Compare Town of Greece, 572 US at 597–98 (Alito concurring), 623–28 (Kagan
dissenting), with Weisman, 505 US at 592–93. See also Bormuth, 870 F3d at 501–02
(sanctioning prayer practice that encouraged children to lead the pledge of allegiance
immediately following the prayer).
223 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 584–89 (discussing what factors would influence a
coercion analysis). See also, for example, Weisman, 505 US at 586, 590, 594 (discussing,
respectively, the extent to which an event is mandatory, the degree of government involvement in propagating the prayer and monitoring attendees, and how other attendees
might react to respectful protest).
224 See Part I.B for discussions of both cases.
225 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 583–85 (noting that prayers that were less solemn
and respectful may violate the Constitution); id at 584 (discussing the prayer giver selection process).
226 Id at 588–91.
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term following Town of Greece, it denied certiorari, over a dissent from Justice Scalia, in a case that could have extended
Town of Greece’s presumption against coercion to another public
high school graduation ceremony that took place in a church but
had no prayer content.227 Similarly, the Court recently denied
certiorari in Lund over an ardent dissent by Justice Thomas.228
Though too much should not be made of the denials of certiorari,
both instances taken together show, at the very least, that the
Sixth Circuit’s capacious reading of Town of Greece is not obviously correct—had the Court intended to simply extend Town of
Greece to these types of cases, it could have issued a per curiam
opinion to that effect.
One obvious counterargument against attempts to distinguish Town of Greece from legislator-led prayer is that it creates an arbitrary and unnecessary discontinuity in the law. For
example, in a concurrence to the Bormuth en banc opinion,
Judge Jeffrey Sutton argued that it would be silly to say that, if
a hired third party had given identical prayers, the practice
would pass constitutional muster.229 Such a minor difference
seems arbitrary and therefore is not enough to distinguish the
case of legislator-led prayer from that offered by a third party.230
This argument, however, ignores the fact that the Court’s holdings on the Establishment Clause, and government prayer in
particular, are already rife with remarkably similar-seeming inconsistencies. For example, one barely religious prayer delivered
by a rabbi was coercive in Weisman, but a decade’s worth of exclusively Christian prayers at government functions at which
children were also present and at which legislators made adjudications affecting meeting participants was not coercive in
Town of Greece. This is the result of two overlapping prophylactic rules, which lead to the same kind of inconsistencies Judge
Sutton argues would be out of place in constitutional law.

227 See generally Elmbrook School District v Doe, 572 US 2283 (2014) (Scalia dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that Town of Greece changed the Establishment
Clause landscape and that lower court decisions issued before it should be revisited).
228 See Rowan County v Lund, 138 S Ct 2564, 2564 (2018) (Thomas dissenting from
denial of certiorari). Unlike Justice Scalia’s dissent in Elmbrook, Justice Thomas’s dissent
in Lund highlights the fact that starkly different laws apply in two different circuits and
argues that it was the Court’s role to “have stepped in to resolve this conflict.” Id at 2567.
229 See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 523 (Sutton concurring). See also Lund, 138 S Ct at
2566 (Thomas dissenting from denial of certiorari).
230 See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 523 (Sutton concurring).
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This Comment’s approach is to recognize that these inconsistencies are actually foundational to the Court’s prayer jurisprudence and to place legislator-led prayer within this broader
context. Moreover, the facts of Bormuth illustrate the limitations of Judge Sutton’s approach. The councilmembers became
offended when the plaintiff criticized their prayers and may
have retaliated against him.231 The possibility of offense and retaliation are greatly heightened when the elected officials have a
personal stake in the prayers—that is, when they are themselves delivering prayers.232 Finally, as illustrated by Professor
Strauss’s freedom of speech example, legislators may use pretexts to hide their unconstitutional animus.233
It would accord more with the government-prayer jurisprudence to take the decision-making about prayer content and
meeting context out of the hands of judges and apply a brightline rule against legislator-led prayer.234 But this then leads to
the obvious question of whether the Town of Greece presumption
of constitutionality should apply in cases in which the legislators
themselves are the exclusive prayer givers. The Sixth Circuit
assumed it did in Bormuth, but the controlling opinion in Town
of Greece reserved judgment on the question.235 As the next Section discusses, a concurrent line of precedent about intermingling
religion and political processes leading to divisiveness indicates
that the practice of legislator-led prayer in intimate localgovernment settings is a per se violation of the Establishment
Clause.
B.

Legislator-Led Prayer Entangles Religion in Political
Processes and Is Politically Divisive, Thereby Violating the
Establishment Clause

Marsh and Town of Greece establish an exception to the
Court’s general Establishment Clause principles because of the
historical pedigree of the practice. Thus, the Court pointedly
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See id at 517–19.
See Part III.B. Even if the legislator leading the prayer was somehow agnostic
about his or her religious beliefs or otherwise not committed to the content of the prayer,
that is far outside the scope of appropriate judicial review. See note 78 and accompanying text.
233 See Part I.B.
234 See note 66 and accompanying text (introducing prophylactic rules); notes 98–
101 and accompanying text (applying the concept to government prayer).
235 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 589–90.
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ignored the Lemon test in its analysis in Marsh.236 But the
practices of the county councils in Jackson and Rowan counties
differ considerably from the practices approved of by the First
Congress. Most importantly, the First Congress approved of only
prayers given by third parties.237 Moreover, the resolution authorizing congressional pastors required hiring two ministers
from different denominations and alternating between the two
houses of Congress.238 While Town of Greece held that the First
Congress’s prayer practice provides an element of constitutionality to similar practices held in different contexts, there is no reason to think that it should extend to different prayer practices
held in different contexts.239 Indeed, as this Section explains, the
practice of having elected officials regularly deliver prayers to
their constituents raises a whole raft of Establishment Clause
problems beyond those contemplated in Town of Greece. Given
the Court’s preference for prophylactic rules in this arena240 and
the availability of perfectly constitutional alternatives, such as
prayers led by third parties, per se unconstitutionality is the appropriate approach to the practices at issue in Lund and
Bormuth.
The practice of legislator-led prayer in intimate gatherings
with constituents entangles religion with political processes in
two ways. First, it establishes an identity between democratic
votes and prayer content. That is, when constituents vote, they
vote specifically for the one person (or set of people) who may
lead prayers at government functions. Because majoritarian
votes fail to safeguard minority viewpoints, “fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote.”241 Second, even if no coercion is
present during town meetings, legislator-led prayer necessarily
injects religion into every decision made by citizen-participants
and every political decision made by councilmembers. In other
words, it has “divisive political potential.”242
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See Marsh, 463 US at 796–801 (Brennan dissenting).
See Lund, 863 F3d at 294 (Motz concurring).
238 See id at 295 (Motz concurring).
239 See id at 294 (Motz concurring). But see Bormuth, 870 F3d at 523 (Sutton concurring). For a thorough discussion of this point, see notes 229–36 and accompanying
text.
240 See notes 98–101, 154, and accompanying text.
241 Santa Fe, 530 US at 304–05, quoting West Virginia Board of Education v
Barnette, 319 US 624, 638 (1943).
242 Lemon, 403 US at 622 (emphasis added).
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Prayer practices that establish an identity between people’s
votes and prayer content are per se unconstitutional under Santa
Fe. In Santa Fe, the Court flatly rejected a proposed policy to allow students to officially lead prayers prior to football games at
a public high school.243 One of the fallback options the school
district (anticipating litigation) wrote into the policy was for
students to vote on who could deliver reflective, not necessarily
religious, speeches.244
The Court ruled that this policy still violated the
Establishment Clause by inviting divisive political potential, a
component of the entanglement prong of Lemon.245 As part of
this analysis, the Court noted that the exclusivity in who can
give the prayers is constitutionally problematic—the policy is
not neutral because (unlike in the later Town of Greece case) only the one person selected through majoritarian means may deliver the invocation.246 This necessarily will exclude people from
minority or disfavored religions.247 Importantly, the Court did
not hold or discuss that children in particular are more susceptible to division than adults. Rather, it faulted the school district
for encouraging the majoritarian voting mechanism in such a
fraught arena, regardless of the age of the voters.248 Therefore, this
case is still instructive notwithstanding the distinction between
Weisman and Town of Greece that adults are more readily able to
deflect coercive influences.
There are other threads in the case law that confirm this
reading of Santa Fe. For example, McCreary County and Van
Orden distinguish between long-standing, established practices
and those that are currently being implemented, particularly if
the content is potentially explosive or sectarian.249 Professor
Fallon wrote that this is the key distinction between the two:
when the content is fixed and nondenominational enough, then
religious symbolism is acceptable, but when the religious content is newly up for debate, then this raises the possibility that
politics and religion will become entangled anew.250
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Santa Fe, 530 US at 305–10.
Id at 308–09.
Id at 311.
See id at 303, 309.
See Santa Fe, 530 US at 304–05.
See id at 311.
See Van Orden, 545 US at 702–03 (Breyer concurring).
Fallon, 128 Harv L Rev at 431 (cited in note 57).
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The distinction between long-standing and novel practices is
analogous to the distinction between third-party and legislatorled prayer; in each pair, the latter is more divisive than the former. The content of the prayers was not meaningfully up for political debate in the Town of Greece case.251 After the opinion, the
only political debate left for constituents and lawmakers in
Greece is whether to maintain the prayer practice as is or abolish it. Likewise, in Van Orden, the long-standing religious display could have been voted on, but changing the content to advocate more or less strongly for different religions would have been
forbidden under Fallon’s reading of the case.252 Having legislators lead the prayers themselves means that the content of each
prayer is up for debate and disputation every few years with
each new election. Lund and Bormuth are therefore closer to
McCreary County, a case in which a new attempt to augment a
Decalogue display was foreclosed because of its potential divisiveness.253 Because the contents of the prayers in Lund and
Bormuth necessarily need to be debated in a political way every
few years, they are constantly running afoul of the rule in
McCreary County—and therefore are always running afoul of
the Constitution.
Moreover, a fact-sensitive review in both cases was more
warranted than with legislative prayer—the religious content in
the Decalogue cases was literally written in stone, whereas here
it is constantly shifting, both from election to election and from
prayer to prayer. Establishing a prophylactic rule with prayer
cases thus also preserves judicial resources and prevents an incoherent doctrine, borne of several fractured opinions, from
springing up. As evidenced by the Court’s enjoining a facially
nonreligious fallback option in Santa Fe, it sometimes makes
more sense to prevent repeated post hoc litigation testing the
limits of the doctrine.
One potential counterargument is that this approach fails to
account for the constitutionality of congressional chaplains and
the Court’s decision in Marsh. These are distinguishable for two
251 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 581–83. The legislator-led prayer cases are therefore also distinguishable from the Court’s favorite expression of religion pronounced at
government functions—the phrase, “God save the United States and this honorable
Court,” said at the beginning of the Court’s sessions. See id at 1825. Because the content
of that phrase is not contingent on regular elections, it would be safe from the prophylactic rule that this Comment suggests.
252 See Fallon, 128 Harv L Rev at 431 (cited in note 57).
253 See Van Orden, 545 US at 703 (Breyer concurring).
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reasons. First, with congressional chaplains, there is no identity
between one’s elected representative and the content of prayers;
indeed, there are several steps between voters in Washington
state and prayer content, delivered by a third-party officiant, in
Washington, DC. This disconnect is underscored by the recent
controversy regarding the House chaplain—citizens voted for
representatives who, for their own pastoral care, hired a chaplain who criticized those representatives. Second, unlike in
Marsh, attendees at a local government meeting are in closer
proximity—both in terms of space and the legislators’ decisionmaking authority—to their legislators than, for example, citizens are to the House of Representatives. Thus, a case like
Bormuth raises immediate constitutional issues because the
council discussed religious matters with Mr. Bormuth and then
came out against him on a nonreligious matter. By contrast, a
House member leading a prayer thousands of miles away from
her district in a venue where she does not interact with constituents does not. The setting of a local county, city, or ward board
meeting provides a unique set of facts in which constituents
meet face-to-face with their representatives under the auspices
of an official government function at which the representatives
make decisions as a government entity.254 It should not be difficult for lower courts to identify these hallmarks of local government meetings and distinguish them from, say, campaign events
or remote legislative sessions.
The practice of religious legislator-led prayer is also more
likely to impermissibly inject religion into politics than is thirdparty prayer. Several justices in Town of Greece emphasized
that the town’s methods of selecting prayer givers were facially
neutral.255 Thus, sometimes a Christian leads the prayer, and
sometimes a Wiccan leads the prayer.256 In this abstracted neutrality argument, the Court can entertain the presumption that
the councilmembers have no personal stake in the specific content of any given prayer. The councilmembers may disapprove of
the third-party delivered prayer as much as the citizen attendees. That presumption cannot stand when the councilmembers themselves give the prayers. Even a respectful gesture such
254 See, for example, Town of Greece, 572 US at 594 (Alito concurring) (acknowledging that aspects of local government meetings are adjudicatory). Perhaps another similar
circumstance would be a trial before an elected judge.
255 See id at 585–86 (Kennedy) (plurality); id at 593–94 (Alito concurring).
256 See id at 572 (Kennedy) (plurality).
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as refusal to stand, or quietly stepping out, could be interpreted
as a personal attack on the councilmember delivering the prayer
and that councilmember’s religious beliefs. And that councilmember, unlike a third-party invitee, has tangible decisionmaking power over the people in attendance for the prayer.
This is a quintessential case that calls for the application of
a prophylactic rule. The facts of Bormuth underscore this point.
The plaintiff complained about the prayer practice and content
and then applied for various positions in the county that required the board’s approval; the councilmembers colorfully criticized his religious objections, and he subsequently did not get
approval.257 The Sixth Circuit noted that there was nothing in
the record suggesting that the board’s decision was animated by
animus or was intended to coerce people into praying along with
them.258 But that argument cuts as strongly against the court’s
holding. As Strauss noted, because finding evidence of animus is
so difficult, the Court has made the use of deliberately overinclusive prophylactic rules “ubiquitous.”259 Even if it is not part of
the “real” Establishment Clause to forbid legislator-led prayer,
judges have effectively no way to police the line between political decisions made on the basis of sound policy and those intended to punish religious minorities. A judge would have to be
omniscient. Legislator-led prayer presents a particularly difficult case for judges—not only do judges have to determine which
prayers “cross[ ] [a] line”;260 they would have to determine to
what extent councilmembers consider constituents’ attentiveness during prayers when making government decisions. Likewise, as in the equal protection context, the Court is typically
skeptical of a majoritarian institution making decisions that
bear on someone’s constitutionally protected minority status.261
While, per Town of Greece, prayers made before a lawmaking
session may not coerce participation, they cast elected officials’

257

See Bormuth, 870 F3d at 525–26 (Moore dissenting).
See id at 519.
259 See generally Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev 190 (cited in note 66).
260 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 596 (Alito concurring).
261 See Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev at 204 n 45 (cited in note 66), citing Palmore v
Sidoti, 466 US 429, 432–33 (1984), and McLaughlin v Florida, 379 US 184, 196 (1964)
(supporting the proposition that government classifications, especially those based on
race, will be upheld only if they support a compelling state interest).
258
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decisions in a potentially unflattering light and could chill fullthroated democratic engagement.262
One limitation to adopting a conclusive prophylactic rule
prohibiting councilmember-led prayer is that it does not fully answer all of the borderline cases that would be sure to arise if this
approach is adopted. For example, occasionally members of
Congress deliver prayers in the chamber—is that alright? When
is a legislative session intimate enough that it raises entanglement concerns? What if a councilmember makes an offhand remark like, “Praise the Lord,” in response to good news from an
attendee of the meeting?
Policing the line between slipups and politically entangled
practices is, mercifully, less difficult than the test announced
in Town of Greece. In fact, it is quite a bit easier. Determining
whether a prayer was off-the-cuff or part of a broader council
practice seems like it would require less digging than investigating whether the prayer was, in the totality of circumstances,
coercive.
The application of a prophylactic rule would also protect
municipalities and legislators who wish to implement prayer
practices. This is an easy-to-understand rule that preserves the
core historical practice of third-party prayer. City councils in the
Fourth Circuit have little guidance as to what impermissibly
crosses the constitutional line, and protracted litigation is all
but destined to ensue from district courts’ misapprehension of
the newly announced test.263 And the Sixth Circuit’s Bormuth
holding, even taken at its most expansive, does not shield municipalities from litigation.264 Thus, applying a strong prophylactic
rule is an improvement over either of the circuits’ approaches.
Unlike the Fourth Circuit’s approach, this rule will be easy to
apply and lead to more consistent outcomes, and unlike the
Sixth Circuit’s approach, this Comment’s preferred rule adequately safeguards constitutional rights.

262 See Town of Greece, 572 US at 621 (Kagan dissenting) (arguing that legislative
prayer practices can “alter[ ] the very nature” of an individual’s “relationship with her
government,” disrupting our process of civic engagement).
263 See generally Recent Case, 131 Harv L Rev 626 (2017) (cited in note 219).
264 42 USC § 1983, the vehicle through which most of these claims are brought into
court, is typically read to preclude fee shifting if the defendant prevails, unless the claim
is frivolous. See, for example, James v City of Boise, 136 S Ct 685, 686 (2016) (per curiam).
Given that Town of Greece explicitly calls the legal question “fact sensitive,” it may be
difficult for winning municipalities to recoup fees because other factual situations may
be nonfrivolously distinguishable.
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CONCLUSION
Despite the sundry tests and rules the Court has set out in
other Establishment Clause contexts, its jurisprudence regarding legislative prayer is remarkably barren. The Town of Greece
decision did little to clear up outstanding confusion. With its
numerous caveats and lack of a majority opinion, Town of Greece
only slightly extends a small exception in the Court’s public
prayer jurisprudence, finding that, when some factors are met,
legislative prayer is presumptively constitutional—even when
the prayer is sectarian and occurs in an intimate forum where
citizens will interact with their representatives.265
Due to the lack of clarity in Town of Greece, many questions
pending its resolution went unanswered, particularly how courts
should analyze prayer given at local government meetings by
councilmembers themselves. Though Town of Greece explicitly
reserves judgment on this question, it does imply that legislative
prayer is not an “exception” to the Establishment Clause and is
thus subject to tests similar to the usual Establishment Clause
tests like any other state practice that may affect religion.266
Therefore, the answers to the nascent circuit split between the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits can be found in the Court’s other
Establishment Clause precedents. Unlike the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits, however, this Comment looked beyond the narrow coercion test to consider in-depth how legislator-led prayer may
warp political processes—and vice versa.
Councilmember-led prayer is distinguishable from Town of
Greece just as Town of Greece can be distinguished from Weisman
and Santa Fe. In Weisman and Santa Fe, the presence of minors
and possibility of surveillance (even at an after-school or nonmandatory graduation event) made prayer in public schools per
se unconstitutional. In contrast, the legislative context in Town
of Greece turned what would otherwise be a clear-cut case of establishment into a presumptively permitted practice.
In Lund and Bormuth, the identity of the person delivering
the prayers changes the entire nature of the prayer practice. Instead of a facially neutral selection process, the prayer giver is
decided by direct election. Moreover, it identifies any person’s
reaction to the prayer with a direct statement about the councilmember’s faith. This makes the decision to leave during the
265
266

See Town of Greece, 572 US at 581–91.
See id at 574–76.
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prayer much more fraught than in Town of Greece and renders
subsequent council decisions involving the peaceful refuser suspect. Though Lund, Bormuth, and this Comment’s proposed solution seemingly turn the minutia of a county board meeting into
a constitutional case, this is exactly the analysis the Court invited
in tailoring its Town of Greece opinion to reach only prayers delivered by third parties.
Finally, the stakes are high: “There are no de minimis violations of the Constitution—no constitutional harms so slight that
the courts are obliged to ignore them.”267 Legislator-led prayers
entangle government and religion and lead to divisiveness on religious grounds in a way that facially neutral third-party prayer
giver policies do not. Even if the policy itself does not necessarily
run afoul of the Constitution, it invites legislators to impermissibly use religious criteria when considering their constituents’
individual claims. A strong prophylactic rule is therefore necessary to prevent reviewing courts from unnecessarily policing
prayer content or failing to remedy civil rights violations when
they in fact occur.

267 Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow, 542 US 1, 36–37 (2004) (O’Connor
concurring).

